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Data Protection Laws and Freedom of Expression: Belgium File:Flag of Belgium.svg


Constitutional/Primary Law Background - See also ECHR and EU Charter

Article 18 of the Belgium Constitution (as revised 2014) on freedom of expression provides for freedom of the press and prohibits both censorship and requirements of security from writers, publishers or printers. It also states that where the author is known and resident in Belgium, the prosecution of the publisher, printer or distributor is prohibited. Article 22 establishes the right to respect for private and family life, excepting in cases and conditions determined by law. Article 15 and 29 provides for more specific protection of the inviolability of the home and confidentiality of letters. There is no constitutional protection for data protection as such. 

The provisions on freedom of expression and inviolability of the home can be found in Article 18 and 10 of the original 1831 Constitution, whilst the provision for the confidentiality of letters can be found in article 22 of the 1893 version.  Inclusion of a right to respect for private and family life itself was not enunciated until the insertion of this as Article 22 in 1994.


First-Generation Statutory Law

On 26 November 1992, a first-generation data protection law, the Act on the Protection of Privacy in relation to the Processing of Personal Data, was adopted and received royal assent on 8 December 1992.
Special Expression
This data protection law did not include an exemption for the processing of any of the special expressive purposes.
Broad Expression
There was similarly no provision.
Personal Exemption
The Act did not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity so long as the data remain at this destination (art. 2(1))
Knowledge Facilitation Framework
Processing for statistical purposes was exempted from the compatibility requirement (art. 5) and the proactive direct transparency rule (art. 11).
No parliamentary debates on the relevant provisions have been found.

Second-Generation Statutory Law

In 1998 Belgium amended its existing legislation by passing the ‘Act Transposing Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data’.  An implementing Royal Decree was adopted in 2001.
Special Expression Derogation
Mirroring Directive 95/46, the amended law provided derogations for processing solely for the purposes of journalism and literature and artistic expression. The data quality principles were applicable within this area without restriction. The exemption from proactive direct and indirect transparency rules was based on a test of minimal substantive content. In sum, processing for these purposes did not need to provide the specified information if this would interfere with the collection of data from the data subject. An exemption from the reactive transparency rule (subject access) was provided not only where this would ‘provide indications as to the sources of information’ but also where compliance would ‘interfere with intended publication’. An exemption from the sensitive information rules was provided ‘if the processing relates to personal data which has apparently been made public by the data subject or which is closely related to the public nature of the data subject or of the facts in which the data subject is involved’. No exemption was provided from the legitimating ground condition. Belgium law does not provide a journalistic exemption from the duty to notify itself. However, as a result of exceptions set out in art. 3(d) of its Data Protection Act, the DPA was not required to place information received on a public register (otherwise governed by art. 18 of the Act). The public would also not have any right to receive this information direct from the media itself. The law did, however, exclude these forms of processing unconditionally from the international data transfer conditions (article 3(3)).
Broad Expression Derogation
There was no special provision.
Personal Exemption
The Act did not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity (article 3(2)).
Knowledge Facilitation Framework
The processing of personal data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes was conditionally exempted from the compatibility requirement (article 4(1)) but not from the other data protection principles.  Under the Decree this was subject to only using encoded i.e. pseudonymous data is possible (art. 5).  Prior to encoding, extensive information and a righ tto objection had to provided to the data subject unless this was permitted through a published DPA decision based on a detailed case grounded in disproportionate effort (art. 18).  Processing of non-encoded data required explicit consent (art. 20) unless such data been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject or that are closely related to the public character of the data subject or of the facts in which the data subject is or was involved or this had been specifically authorised by the published DPA recommendation based on a specific case justified on the basis of disprorportionate effort (arts. 20-21).  Any publication of data in identified form required the explicit consent and ensuring that hte privacy of third parties was not violated unless data been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject or that are closely related to the public character of the data subject or of the facts in which the data subject is or was involved (art. 23).  No exemption was further provided from the proactive direct transparency rule.  A derogation enabling postponing providing a data subject with reactive transparency (subject access) was provided but only for health related data processed for medical-scientific research and only if (i) there is no risk of infringing on the data subject’s right to protection of his or her privacy; (ii) the processed data does not form the basis of to take a decision with regard to the individual; and (iii) informing the data subject would seriously compromise the research (DP Act, article 10(2)). Sensitive data could be processed for scientific research, if carried out in accordance with the Data Protection Decree and the individual opinion required from the Commission for the Protection of Privacy (article 6(2)(g) and article 7(2)(k) for health-related personal data). No exemptions were granted from the international data transfer, legitimating ground conditions and DPA notification conditions.
Parliamentary Debates
Special Expression Derogation
Presenting the implementation law to Parliament in an explanatory note commenting on the proposed articles, it was observed that Article 9 of the European Directive stipulated that Member States shall provide for exemptions and derogations necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with freedom of expression. Exemptions and derogations were to be limited to Chapters II (general conditions for the lawfulness of processing of personal data), IV (transfer of personal data to third countries) and VI (supervisory authority).
Pursuant to the explanatory note, not all processing for journalistic purposes could therefore be completely excluded from the application of the Data Protection Law. Explaining the legislation currently applicable, the note observed that the Data Protection Law of 8 December 1992 did not provide for an exemption for processing for journalistic purposes. The Belgian Commission for the Protection of Privacy has, however, decided that certain exceptions should exist for journalistic processing of personal data, namely in relation to the processing of special and judicial (i.e. criminal-related) data (Article 6 to 8 of the 1992 Data Protection Law), the obligation to inform the data subject (Article 9 of the 1992 Data Protection Law), and the right to access data (Article 10 of the 1992 Data Protection Law).[1]
The preliminary draft of the implementing law submitted to the Conseil d’Etat proposed to adopt Article 9 of the Directive verbatim. This would have required a case-by-case assessment of the extent to which the data protection provisions applied to the processing for journalistic purposes. This approach was strongly criticized by the Conseil d’Etat in its opinion on the preliminary draft as placing too much trust and decision-making power in the hands of the judiciary. The proposed Article 3(3) was accordingly redrafted substantially. For each provision of the proposed law from which a derogation was allowed pursuant to Article 9 of the Directive, it was examined how its application might threaten the essential interests in communicating with the public and thus the activities of journalists, writers and artists. Instead of retaining the vague and general formulation in Article 9 of the Directive, specific rules were accordingly elaborated for each provision of the law, describing the circumstances under which journalists, writers and artists could invoke their freedom of expression to avoid the application of data protection norms to their work. When exempting processing from these provisions, it was stated that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights should serve as guidance. A journalist may, for example, only process sensitive or health-related data on public figures such as professional sportsmen and women for the purpose of reporting on it in the press. A journalist should also be allowed to process medical data to the extent that the public has a right to be kept informed about an important public health issue. Overall, journalists must be able to process data which has been made available to the public as a whole or, in light of the legitimate interest of the public to receive full and adequate information, data on persons of public interest which have not been made public by the respective person him- or herself. It was thereby considered to be important that the data must be closely related to the ‘public nature’ (‘caractère public de la personne concernée’) of the data subject. Pursuant to the explanatory note, such processing of sensitive personal, medical or judicial data must evidently contribute to the free formation of public opinion.[2]
Discussing the articles from which processing for journalistic purposes was exempted, the explanatory note elaborated with regard to Article 9 of the proposed implementing law that an exemption from the obligation to notify the data subject when collecting, recording or communicating data to third parties was necessary to allow certain forms of journalism, such as journalistic investigations on human trafficking, asylum policy etc. Otherwise, Article 9 of the proposed implementing law would make ‘undercover’ journalism—which requires the journalist’s identity to remain secret—impossible. Article 10 of the Directive, which gave the data subject the right of access to personal data concerning him or her contained in a processing operation, also obliges the controller to provide the available information about the origin of the data. It would therefore be difficult to reconcile with the right of the journalist not to disclose his or her source. However, the applicability of this provision and also the right to rectification in Article 12 would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis. Only data which would compromise the secrecy of journalistic sources or a planned publication would fall within the scope of the exemption. For other data, the rights to access and rectification would have to be granted. Articles 17 and 18 concerned the obligation to report automated processing operations to the Privacy Commission and the public register of automated processing operations. Pursuant to the explanatory note, the reporting of the processing for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes would not have to include any data which would expose the source thereof.[3]]
In addition to journalistic activity, literary and artistic activities were also examined. It was maintained that although artists and writers would process personal data less frequently and the objectives pursued by artists and writers were generally different from those of journalists, they should be subjected to the same regime to avoid insoluble discussion on what constitute literary, artistic or journalistic purposes.[4]
The Commission of Justice’s Report on the proposed implementing law shines light on some of the discussions members of the Commission had with regard to the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes.[5] Mr. Landuyt observed that under the new implementing law, judicial information could be processed by an investigative journalist. The Minister of Justice confirmed this observation but cautioned that such processing was only permissible if three conditions were met: (i) the respective personal data must have been manifestly made public by the data subject or which must concern the public nature of the data subject; (ii) the processing must contribute to the free formation of public opinion; and (iii) the accuracy of the data must be verified by any means reasonably available to the controller before being made public.[6] Mr Landuyt replied that the provision’s meaning was not very clear. In particular, he criticized that the standard that the processing should contribute to a free formation of public opinion would hardly guarantee the data subject’s rights. He further criticized that a journalist would be allowed to process more data than a politician. The Minister of Justice countered that the proposed provision merely implemented the exemptions and derogations for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes provided for by the EU Directive. The Conseil d’Etat, however, conceded pursuant to the Minister of Justice, that the wording was too vague and the post facto control insufficient. New, more precise wording would therefore be sought to be introduced. The Minister of Justice, in contrast, emphasized that it was necessary that the processing of personal including medical and judicial data for journalistic purposes had a clear legal basis. In principle, it was necessary that any person whose data is being processed was informed thereof. However, this would make ‘undercover’ journalism impossible. It would, moreover, be out of question to oblige a journalist to reveal his or her sources. The draft law’s proposed exemptions would therefore be adequate. The above criticized conditions for the exemptions, moreover, derived from European and Belgian case law.[7]
Mr. Leterme subsequently asked why the draft was not providing different categories of exemptions as, it was argued, was proposed in the EU Directive. The Minister of Justice answered that such a uniform regulation was a deliberate choice aimed at preventing circumvention of the rules as these categories were not always easy to delineate. Mr. Landuyt then pointed out that a journalist who does not meet the criteria laid down in Article 3(3) of the implementing law could simply invoke the household exemptions laid down in Article 3(2). The Minister of Justice argued that a journalist who processes personal data for personal purposes may not use such processed data for journalistic purposes later on.
Mr. Lozie then asked the Minister of Justice how it could be checked whether a journalist has respected the limitations imposed by the draft law. In response, the Minister referred to the earlier discussed criteria on which journalists could rely to establish whether they could rely on the exemption in Article 3(3).[8]
In the discussions of the individual articles of the proposed implementing law, Mr. Landuyt introduced an amendment to clarify the proposed text of Article 3(3). The amendment was limited to providing that Articles 13 to 15a would not apply to the processing of personal data carried out solely for the purposes of journalism or artistic or literary expression, where the processing relates to personal data which have been manifestly made public by the data subject or to data closely connected with the public nature of a data subject. The members of the Commission, however, considered it to be preferable to leave such specifications to the judiciary. Mr. Landuyt, in contrast, cautioned that the current formulation of the provision would over-regulate the journalistic profession, going beyond what the EU Directive prescribed. As such, the proposed provision would allow judges to interpret journalistic activities in a manner which is more restrictive than what is required by law. The law should therefore rigidly specify under what conditions journalistic processing of personal data would be exempted. Similarly, the criterion of ‘free formation of public opinion’ could be interpreted narrowly by judges. A judge may, for instance, decide that a tabloid newspaper did not contribute to the free formation of public opinion. A judge could thus punish a journalist before he or she even published an article. Mr. Landuyt did not object to the provision’s objective per se, but rather to the possibility of introducing a de facto instrument of censorship into law.[9]
Mr. Willems observed that the proposed provision would certainly not intend to curtail journalistic freedom. The Minister of Justice’s representative acknowledged that the provision would appear to be very complex. Although the previous draft was much simpler, it has also been heavily criticized as noncompliant with the requirement that any derogation from rights must be provided for by law. However, the same charge could also be levied against the proposed amendment by Mr. Landuyt, which lacked nuance and treats the publication of any personal data as a manifestation of freedom of expression.[10] In a further exchange, Mr. Landuyt reiterated his criticism that the conditions for invoking the exemption were too vague even for judges to examine compliance with them. What was fundamentally at issue was the manner in which journalists could gather data.[11] While expressing understanding for this criticism, the Minister of Justice’s representative countered that the proposed amendment would not capture the essence of the section and was flawed. The criterion of ‘free formation of public opinion’ would delimit the exemption in a manner which would not protect slander or defamation.[12] He affirmed that the currently proposed law would protect the processing of personal data carried out solely for the purposes of journalism or artistic or literary expression in so far as, inter alia, their application would jeopardise a planned publication or reveal a source. As such, the proposed implementing law explicitly aims to enable journalists to exercise their profession without any obstacles despite more stringent data protection provisions. Furthermore, whether the data relied upon for journalistic purposes was truthful, up-to-date and correct was beside the point. Rather, a journalist was under an obligation to check the accuracy of his or her publicised reporting. A journalist could thus not be blamed simply for the fact that his or her files contained incorrect data.[13]
Mr. Lozie subsequently objected to any conditions in relation to the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes. Such conditions would imply a possibility for control and endangered the secrecy of sources. It would, moreover, be impossible to check whether a journalist actually complied with the conditions without consulting the source. The Minister of Justice’s representative replied that at least the conditions set out in Article 3(3)(b)[14] should be maintained.[15]
In response, Mr. Landuyt challenged the Minister’s interpretation. Due to its imprecision, such a condition would give rise to numerous lawsuits. He maintained that the case law on unlawful acts and the criminal provisions on slander and defamation would sufficiently regulate this matter. He therefore advocated deleting the words ‘treatment contributes to free formation of opinion’ and the words ‘the accuracy of the data processed shall be verified, prior to publication, by any means reasonably available to the controller’ as they would allow an ex ante censorship.[16] As the Minister’s representative did not object to the deletion of the two aforementioned phrases, Mr. Landuyt submitted an amendment to delete the second and third indents in proposed Article 3(3)(a) and the second indent in Article 3(3)(c).[17]
In response to Ms. De T’Serclaes, the Minister’s representative finally clarified that, pursuant to European law, the term ‘journalist’ primarily referred to a function, which is not limited to professional journalists but extended to anyone who made use of the freedom of expression. Persons who write a single article and collect data for this purpose still fall within the scope of the provision. A precise definition of the terms ‘journalism’ and ‘freedom of expression’ in the proposed law was therefore not desirable.[18]
Broad Expression Derogation
There was no relevant debate.
Personal Exemption
There was no relevant debate.
Knowledge Facilitation Derogation
The exemption for processing of personal data for scientific purposes did not give rise to much discussion. The Conseil d’Etat merely observed that it would have to be clear that the purpose of scientific research was an exclusive one. What would also need to be clarified was that patient data for medical research purposes must be accessible for the respective patients at request, unless the patient has clearly waived such right to access.[19] It was, moreover, observed that the proposed law failed to mention, in contrast to the Directive, that any measure or decision relating to ‘specific persons’ would be excluded. It was argued that this would need to be corrected.

Third-Generation Statutory Law

Belgium has implemented the GDPR with the Act on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data (hereafter Data Protection Law), which was adopted on 19 July 2018.
Special Expression Derogation
The data protection law provides journalism with an exemption from both the transparency and the sensitive data rules which is in principle categorical. However, it is stated that those availing themselves of those derogations must be subject to journalistic ethic rules. In contrast, the data protection law establishes that those engaged in academic, artistic or literary expressive may benefit from an absolute exemption from the transparency and sensitive data rules without having to be subject to professional rules as applies in relation to journalism (s. 24).  This provision states that journalistic processes includes archiving with a view to informing the public so long as the controller is subject to journalistic ethic rules but does not otherwise explicitly establish the priority of this derogation over the Knowledge Facilitation Framework.
Broad Expression Derogation
There is no special provision here.
Personal Exemption – see GDPR, art. 2(2)(c)
Knowledge Facilitation Framework – see also GPDR, art. 5(1)(b) (compatibility), art. 5(1)(e) (time limits) and art. 89(1) (appropriate safeguards)
Derogations from articles 15, 16, 18 and 21 are provided for the processing of personal data for scientific and historical purposes and from 15 to 21 for the purpose of archiving in the public interest, where the application of these articles could make it impossible or seriously impede processing for these purposes and where derogation is necessary to achieve the purposes (art. 186 Data Protection Law).  The Act's provisions for scientific and historical research purposes and statistical authorised the processing of personal data of all types so long as this was pseuonymised (art. 198).  It also generally allowed for the dissemination for these puposes of pseudonymised data other than sensitive data as defined in article 9(1) of the GDPR.  The communication of non-pseudonymised sensitive data (as defined in both article 9(1) and article 10 of the GDPR) for these purposes was subject to the requirement that further reproduction not be possible except in handwritten form (art. 207(1)) except where the data subject had given their consent, the data was made public by the data subject, the data is closely linked to te public or historical nature of the data subjct or the data are closely linked to the public or historical nature of facts in which the data subject was invovled (art. 208).  The same requirements were placed on data whose reproduction might compromise the safety of the data subject (art. 207(3)).
Discussions in the Legislative Process
Special Expression Derogation
The Belgian Chamber of Representative’s Commentary on the draft law disagreed with the Council of State, which argued that article 85 GDPR had to be implemented in its entirety and should be broader in scope than processing for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes. It accordingly maintained that this was not the purpose of the proposed draft law and that article 85(1) would not require a specific law to regulate the relationship between freedom of expression and the protection of personal data. Rather, the legislator was generally required to ensure that this relationship is reconciled in any regulation that might affect this delicate balance.
In its commentary on the draft legislation to implement the GDPR, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives observed that the GDPR did not define what processing for ‘journalistic purposes’ means.[20]
On 16 October 2013, the Council for Journalistic Ethics had adopted its Code of Ethics for Journalists, which defined the purpose of journalism as ‘the duty to inform the public about matters of general interest.’[21] Information of general interest is thereby ‘information that evokes one or more issues for life in society as a whole or for one of its components.’[22] On the basis thereof, the Chamber of Representatives then held that information of general interest should be defined in line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which journalists enjoy a heightened protection as they play an essential role in democracies as ‘watchdogs’. It would accordingly be necessary to understand ‘journalistic purposes’ widely. The Chamber of Representatives had therefore amended the initial definition, as was recommended by the Council of State. In light of Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution, which guarantees freedom of the press, it moreover considered the ‘press’ not to be limited to the printed press but that the concept of press should be subject to an ‘evolving interpretation’ so as to include means of telecommunication such as the internet.[23] Accordingly, the concept of media extends to ‘anybody which disseminates information to an undetermined public, using whatever mode of communication or form’[24] who should, however, be subject to the rules of journalistic ethics. The eventually adopted definition accordingly held that processing of personal data for journalistic purposes means ‘the preparation, collection, drafting, production, dissemination or archiving with a view to informing the public, via any medium, and where the controller imposes on itself rules of journalistic ethics’.[25]
As a consequence of Belgian and the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on freedom of expression in the context of journalism, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives considered that article 85 GDPR would have to be interpreted to exempt processing for journalistic purposes from all provisions of the Regulation whose application could constitute an a priori control of processing operations for journalistic purposes. The Chamber then went on to examine each article which may be relevant to upholding the current protection of journalists under Belgian law and contrasted the respective articles with the GDPR. To begin with, Belgian law protects the secrecy of journalistic sources. Pursuant to the commentary of the Chamber of Representatives, Article 6(1)(f) GDPR would serve as a legal basis, authorizing the controller for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes to process data independently of the data subject’s consent. Journalists may still carry out ‘under-cover’ investigations or continue processing personal data even if the data subject has not consented or withdraws his or her initial consent.[26] The controller who processes data for such purposes does, moreover, not have the obligation to inform the data subject when collecting information from him or her.[27] The controller is further exempted from the obligation to give a right of rectification to the person concerned. The Chamber of Representatives thereby emphasized that the right of rectification must not be confused with the right to reply. However, the right to be forgotten should still apply to processing for journalistic purposes.[28] The right to object to processing of personal data, in contrast, conflicts with the journalistic freedom of expression and was therefore to be exempted as well. The Chamber of Representatives also exempted the personal data processed solely for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes from the cross-border transfers of personal data provisions of the GDPR.
In its specific comments on the initial draft of article 29, which was drafted to implement article 85 GDPR, the Chamber of Representatives held in summary that it was necessary to clarify that a broad interpretation of the concepts linked to the freedom of expression was necessary pursuant to recital 153 GDPR and that the language of the proposed article had to be adopted accordingly. It also argued that the exemptions should be expressly and finitely listed.[29]  It was, moreover, argued that no derogations from articles 18 and 21 GDPR would be necessary as the balancing of the right to data protection and freedom of expression and information would in principle not require a derogation from the exercise of these rights.
Parliamentary Debates
Special Expression Derogation
MP Hellings suggested to drop the reference to the rules of journalistic ethics in article 24, arguing that it was too vague and rather proposed aligning it better with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.[30]
MP Laurette Onkeliny equally suggested to amend article 24 of the proposed implementation law so as to clearly define ‘journalistic activity’ in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.[31] In his opening statement, Philippe De Backer, the Secretary of State inter alia for Privacy, mentioned the need to balance freedom of expression for journalists with data protection. He thereby noted that the status of ‘journalist’ was not a status protected by a professional body in Belgium. He further observed that it was necessary to balance the potential of censorship and the protection of personal data. In order to avoid the potential of censorship, the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes could only be subjected to control by the Data Protection Authority (DPA) after publication. Moreover, the secrecy of journalistic sources must be protected. He accordingly advocated for a derogation from all GDPR provisions (not further specified) which would potentially infringe on this fundamental principle. In his opinion, the original wording of article 24 struck an appropriate balance and the above mentioned amendments would therefore not be necessary.[32] In the ensuing discussion of the draft law, the head of the DPA Mr Debeuckelaere expressed his regret that Article 24 did not mention the rights of citizens and, in his opinion, did not balance citizens’ rights with the freedom of the press.[33] MP Egbert Lachaert was recorded as considering that the way the journalism exception has been dealt with is a fair compromise but that the definition of journalist ‘leaves something to be desired’. Ms Laurette Onkelinx further questioned whether views from journalists’ associations will be taken into account and whether an extension of the arrangements for journalists will apply to other associations completing investigative journalism such as Greenpeace. The Secretary of State’s response was that balancing freedom of the press with right to privacy is difficult and that as Belgium does not strictly define ‘journalist’, ‘the government has chosen to provide an exception wide enough for journalists while ensuring transparency through the maintenance of a register’. For journalists to be totally exempt from the GDPR would be ‘hardly acceptable’. Journalists’ associations had been listened to but given the lack of definition it was ‘difficult to appoint a clearly defined group of people following always the rules of ethics of the profession’ so a code of ethics should be developed to be followed by all journalists. The changing media landscape meant many more people could call themselves journalists. 
Article 24 on processing for journalistic purposes and for academic, artistic or literary expressions was finally adopted after the first reading on 6 July 2018.[34] No comments were made on this article in the second reading.
Knowledge Facilitation Framework
With regard to research, Ms Laurette Onkelinx questioned whether the opportunities in the GDPR for exemptions in relation to research had been taken. She argued that ‘scientific research’ was interpreted in the bill ‘rather restrictively’. The Secretary of State responded that ‘exceptions must be interpreted restrictively. The provisions listed under Title IV make scientific research possible. They allow research centres and universities to engage in research. Use of data must be subject to sufficient protection but must also allow scientific research’.[35]

[1] Chambre des Représants de Belgique, ‘Project the Loi transposant la Directive 95/46/CE du 24 octobre 1995 du Parlement européen et du Conseil relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données’ (20 Mai 1998) (last accessed 7 November 2020).
[2] Ibid, pp. 19-21.
[3] Ibid, pp. 21-23.
[4] Ibid, p. 19.
[5] Chambre des représentants de Belgique, ‘Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice’ (5 November 1998) (last accessed 7 February 2020).
[6] Ibid, p. 18.
[7] Ibid, p. 18-19.
[8] Ibid, p. 20.
[9] Ibid, p. 74-75.
[10] Ibid, p. 76.
[11] Ibid, p. 76-77.
[12] Ibid, p. 77.
[13] Ibid, p. 77. 
[14] (i) application interferes with the collection of data; (ii) application interferes with an intended publication; (iii) application provides indications as to the sources of information.
[15] Ibid, p. 78.
[16] Ibid, p. 79.
[17] Ibid, p. 80.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid, p. 221.
[20] Chambre des représentatnts de Belgique, ‘Project de loi relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des tratements de données à caractère personnel’ (11 June 2018) Doc. 54 3126/001 (last accessed 5 March 2021), p. 50.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid, p. 51.
[25] Art. 24(1) Data Protection Law.
[26] Ibid, p. 52.
[27] Ibid, p. 53.
[28] Ibid, p. 54.
[29] Ibid, p. 427 et seq.
[30] Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Project de loi relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des tratements de données à caractère personne – Amendements’ (3 July 2018) Doc 54 3126/002  (last accessed 5 March 2021).
[31] Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Project de loi relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des tratements de données à caractère personne – Rapport de la première lecture fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice par M. Peter Dedecker’ (6 July 2018) Doc 54 3126/003 (last accessed 5 March 2021), p. 87-88.
[32] Ibid, p. 3 et seq.
[33] Ibid, p. 137.
[34] Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Project de loi relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des tratements de données à caractère personne – Articles adoptés en première lecture par la Commission de la Justice’ (6 July 2018) Doc 54 3126/004 (last accessed 24 January 2020), p. 18.
[35] Ibid, p. 159.