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Data Protection Laws and Freedom of Expression: SwitzerlandFile:Flag of Switzerland.svg

 

 

I. First-Generation Statutory Law

Switzerland adopted its first Loi fédérale sur la protection des données SR 235.1) on 19 June 1992.
 
Special Expression Derogation
Pursuant to Art. 10, the right to access personal data was not applicable to individuals working in media [‘Medienschaffende’]. Accordingly, if such data are exclusively used for publications in the editiorial part of a periodically published medium the right to access personal data could be denied, limited or defer, if (a) personal data would reveal the source of the information; (b) such access would reveal the drafts for the publication; or (c) would endanger the free formation of opinion by the public. Medienschaffende could, moreover, deny, limit or defer the right to access personal data if the respective data collection served exclusively as a personal ‘work instrument’ [‘Arbeitsinstrument’].
The processing of ‘professional’ personal data exclusively for the publication in the editorial part of a periodically published medium could, furthermore, serve as a public interest justification for the processing of personal data which breached the affected individual’s personality [‘Persönlichkeit’] (art. 13(2)(d)).
 
Broad Expression Derogation
No specific provision was adopted in this regard.
 
Personal Exemption
The Data Protection Law of 1992 was not applicable personal data which were processed by an individual for exclusively personal purposes and were not shared with third parties [‘Aussenstehende’] (art. 2(2)(a)).
 
Knowledge Facilitation Framework
As with the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes, the processing of such data for non-personal purposes [‘nicht personenbezogene Zwecke’] by private persons such as research, planning or statistics and their publication in a manner which does not allow for the identification of the affected persons could serve as a public interest justification for the processing of personal data in violation of the affected individual’s personality [‘Persönlichkeit’] (art. 22(1)).
Organs of the federal government could, moreover, process personal data for non-personal purposes, in particular research, planning and statistics, if (a) the data was anonymized as soon as the purpose of the processing allows for it; (b) the data was only shared further with the permission of the relevant organ of the federal government; and (c) if the results of the processing were published in a manner which does not allow the identification of the affected individuals. If these conditions were met, derogations from compatibility clause, the legitimating ground and notification conditions were permissible (art. 22(2)).
Parliamentary (and wider Legislative) Debates
Special Expression Derogation
In its report introducing and commenting on the proposed Data Protection Law, the Federal Council noted that the publication of personal data by media outlets raises numerous problems. On the one hand, journalists and media companies would have various ways of obtaining data and would be particularly interested in sensitive data. As journalists often work under time pressure, the accuracy of the collected data could not always be entirely secured. They would, moreover, frequently collect data in advance, resulting in extensive data banks being kept over long periods of time. On the other hand, a functioning media landscape was vital for democracy. The media could only fulfil its obligations in a democracy if they enjoyed a certain freedom in their processing of ‘delicate’ [‘heikel’] data and could adequately protect their sources.[1] As a consequence, public interest in an ‘self-sufficient and independent’ [‘selbständig und unabhängig’] media is to be weighed higher than the protection of personal data in certain circumstances. Accordingly, periodical media—but expressly not books or films—should receive special protection and be allowed to derogate from certain data protection principles. The limitation to periodical media was explained in terms of their dominating role for the formation of public opinion. The definition of the term ‘periodical media’ would be aligned with the definition in the Swiss Civil Code (Art. 28c(3) and 28g ZGB). The derogation would also apply where the relevant data were disclosed to third parties in light of a planned publication. This would ensure that those journalists which work to gather data for the printed press, radio and television (such as picture or news agencies) would also be protected.[2]
 
Rapporteur Danioth introduced the proposal to the responsible Commission of the Ständerat [Council of States]. He observed that the Commission was well aware of the conflicting interests of the right to freedom of expression and information and to data protection. Several publishers, journalists and the state’s radio and television service (SRG) had voiced their concerns about potential restrictions of their constitutional rights and accordingly demanded to be generally excluded from the application of the proposed law. However, pursuant to Rapporteur Danioth, the Federal Council as well as all experts now agreed that it would not be compatible with the Swiss understanding of the State and the Law to generally exclude the media from the application of the data protection law. It was therefore agreed, also in consultation with experts and the industry, that the media should comply with the material principles of data protection [‘die materiellen Grundsätze des Datenschutzes’] when processing data either prior to or after publication. The right to access information and the right to rectify false data could, however, be rejected by the respective journalists before a publication, but would have to be granted after publication. Such an ex-post granting of data protection rights would also contribute to a more general compliance with data protection principles prior to publication.[3] MP Rüesch argued that journalists would be quite active in collecting data [‘Ficherei’]. While recognizing the importance of the media as a guardian of the democracy, such media should be subjected to the data protection law. What is applicable to the State, he argued, should also be applicable to the media. After all, the population should be protected from overbearing media snooping [‘Schnüfflerei’].[4]
 
In the debate of the Nationalrat [National Council], the conflict between the right to freedom of expression and information and to data protection was extensively discussed.   MP Cotti, who reported on the law from the responsible Commission, stated that the Federal Council and the Ständerat have opted to exclude periodical media from the application of the data protection law. The responsible Commission of the Nationalrat, however, disagreed. The Commission namely proposed to subject the media to the data protection principles but modify the conditions for the right to access and the justifications for processing of personal data.[5] This would not introduce any kind of preventative censorship. It would grant to the media the greatest possible freedom to pursue their journalistic activity while protecting the citizen against abuses and misconduct in the processing of their data. The complete exception of the media as proposed by the Federal Council and the Council of State, in contrast, would have made the law ineffective und unnecessary. It would, for example, be impossible to correct inaccurate data on an individual and thus restore his or her image after a disreputable article. Freedom of the Press should, moreover, not be confused with the freedom to spread false information. The right to truthful information would and should take precedent over the right to inform.[6]
MP Nabholz also noted the difficulty of finding the right balance between data protection and the protection of journalistic freedom of expression. The wish voiced by the media to be generally excluded from the application of the data protection law was seriously and thoroughly examined.[7] However, the question whether data protection should also apply to the media was the wrong question to be asked. Rather, it should be asked whether individuals should have their personality rights protected [‘Persönlichkeitsschutz’] or not. It was the philosophy of the Commission of the Nationalrat that it was necessary to protect the personality rights of individuals. She named two reasons for subjecting the media to the data protection law in general. First, data are not only collected for the purpose of editorial work. Rather, the media increasingly commercializes collected data. Second, the damage done by the publication of false data can be devastating for an individual. The right to reply pursuant to Art. 28 of the Civil Code [the Zivilgesetzbuch] would not provide sufficient protection in this regard. The freedom of the Press is not intrinsically valuable but rather instrumentally valuable for the freedom of forming an opinion. This would have to be taken into account when settling on a balance between the conflicting rights to data protection and to journalistic freedom of expression.[8]
MP Zölch agreed with MP Nabholz. The media should be subjected to the data protection law. The publication of wrong data could cause great damage. However, she, too, highlighted the importance of a free expression of opinion and the freedom of the press as the highest fundamental freedoms in a democracy. The data protection law should therefore avoid introducing any kind of preventative censorship. Yet, MP Zölch agreed with the changes introduced by the Commission. These changes would protect the confidentiality of sources and ensure that information breaching of the personality rights of an individual, but which are in the public interest, could be published.[9]
MP Scheidegger noted that it is clear that a pluralistic society as it exists in Switzerland is based on a free and diverse journalistic and media landscape. It would thus be understandable that the media reacted sensitively to the proposed data protection law. However, he was convinced that on the tightrope walk between data protection and journalistic freedom of expression a good compromise was found with the proposed law.[10] The media could not have been exempted from the data protection principles. As he noted, large media corporations would process and supply considerable and significant amounts of data, which is not only used for journalistic but also commercial purposes. Such commercial processing should thus not be privileged. For the processing of data for journalistic purposes, in contrast, differentiated rules were required.[11]
MP Vollmer, in contrast, called the proposed regulation of the media ‘unsatisfactory’.[12] While the commercialization of the media posed a far greater threat to democracy than data protection regulation, such data protection regulation should nonetheless not impair an independent and free media. He observed that different solutions for the media have been extensively discussed in the Commission and that, whilst the current proposal would overall be acceptable, the proposed rights to inspect journalists and media workers remained problematic. MP Vollmer noted that the right to access should be further discussed.[13]
Similarly, MP Thür while agreeing that the media should be subjected to the law, thought that the provision proposed by the Commission went too far and should be corrected.[14]
MP Günter also voiced concerns regarding the balance between protecting individuals against prejudicial or defamatory reporting and the protection of journalists to critically question society.[15]
MP Guinand also insisted that the media should principally be subjected to the law, but that account be taken of their special constitutional and political significance. He in particular agreed with the Commission of the Nationalrat that no exception is necessary from the right of rectification.[16]
MP Portmann highlighted the importance of a free and independent media in a democratic society. The media could, however, only fulfil its functions if it worked with true and accurate data, it was therefore necessary to subject the media to data protection principles. He saw a gap between the ideological aspirations of journalistic freedom of expression and the reality of its exercise. Accordingly, in order to prevent a misuse of personal data by the media, it would have to be subjected to data protection regulation as proposed in the draft law.[17]
Federal Councilor Koller noted that the Federal Council agreed with the Commission of the Nationalrat that the media could not be completely exempted from the application of the data protection law. Publication of false information could cause severe damage to an individual.[18]
After the debate, MP Nabholzer clarified that the Ständerat held that the data protection law should only apply to unpublished data. For published data, the provisions of Art. 28 of the Civil Code should be declared applicable. She noted, that this would make clear that neither the Federal Council nor the Ständerat ever had the intention of completely excluding the media from the application of the data protection law.[19]
 
In the detailed debate on the subsequent day, the provisions relating to the media were thoroughly debated. MP Thür opened the debate observing that a majority if not all members of the Nationalrat shared the opinion that the media should generally be subject to the law. The Federal Council had proposed to distinguish between published and unpublished data. As the pre-publication phase is particularly sensitive, the Ständerat had proposed to introduce an exemption for the processing of such data. The media could deny, restrict or postpone the right to access such data if such data was processed exclusively for publication in a periodical medium. While MP Thür generally deemed this approach to be correct, he noted that there was a problem as advertisement could also be published in a periodical medium. He accordingly proposed to add “in the editorial part of a periodically published medium”.[20] MP Thür moreover rejected the proposal by the Commission to subject the media exemption to the requirement that the restriction of the respective data protection rights were subject to the condition that publication contributed to the free formation of public opinion. This notion, according to him, was too unprecise and subjective.[21]
MP Vollmer emphasised the fundamental importance of the media in a democracy and a critical, independent and political societal discourse. He supported both proposals of MP Thür. With regard to the notion of ‘contribution to a free formation of public opinion’, he noted that the inclusion of such a condition would lead to a ‘judicialisation’ of journalism and unnecessarily subject journalists work to judicial scrutiny.
MP Jeanprêtre rejected the version proposed by the Commission of the Nationalrat as unworkable. She in particular rejected the notion of ‘contribution to a free formation of opinion’ on the basis that it would essentially reverse the burden of proof. She thus expressed support for the proposal presented by MP Thür.[22]
MP Grendelmeier warned that the law should not become a preventative instrument, suppressing critical reporting. She also feared that privileging the media without clarifying that only data processed for the editorial part of a periodical newspaper would mean that commercial activities were also exempted. She therefore supported the proposal presented by MP Thür.[23]
MP Zölch, in contrast, argued that the proposal presented by MP Thür should be rejected. Journalism should always contribute to the ‘free formation of public opinion’ and was thus no end in itself.[24]
MP Eggly, who was himself a journalist, supported the proposal presented by MP Thür. The Commission’s proposal would result in a preventative self-censorship which would paralyse the free media.[25] MP Scheidegger, also a former journalist, in contrast, supported the Commission’s proposal. He noted that there would always be a certain conflict between journalism and politicians, but that the politicians did not make the proposal in order to restrict journalistic freedom of expression as alleged in the news.[26] MP Salvioni criticized that the jurisprudence always applied laws excessively rigorously to journalists.[27] He supported the proposal of MP Thür, as the Commission’s proposal would impose too severe restrictions on the media, especially when compared to countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden which fully exempted the media from their data protection laws.[28]
MP Longet, too, feared the commercialization of the press, but agreed with MP Eggly and MP Salvioni that a free media was crucial in a democracy. He therefore supported MP Thür’s proposal.[29]
MP Portmann supported the Commission’s proposal. The notion of ‘contribution to the formation of the public opinion’ was necessary as it would ensure that journalism was not an end in itself but served an important democratic and rule of law function.[30]
MP Maitre rejected the Commission’s proposal in favour of MP Thür’s proposal. He observed that the former would restrict journalistic freedom of expression unnecessarily. Art. 28 of the Civil Code would ensure an additional layer of protection of the rights of individuals.
MP Bonny then introduced another amendment, which he situated between the Commission’s and MP Thür’s proposal. He aimed to delete the notion ‘contribution to the free formation of public opinion’. Although well meant, the notion lacked precision and was subjective. He also aimed to delete the word ‘in particular’, to ensure that the list of the three privileges was clearly exhaustive. MP Vollmer criticized MP Bonny. He observed if the ‘in particular’ was deleted, it would have to be made clear that media could only restrict the right to access under these three provisions.[31]
MP Müller-Meilen also supported the deletion of the notion of ‘contribution to a free formation of public opinion’ as it would leave much room for judicial interpretation.[32] In response to MP Bonny’s proposal, MP Nebiker noted that the deletion of ‘in particular’ would further restrict the rights of journalists. The proposal of the Commission was therefore more liberal and should be supported.[33] MP Guinand, in contrast, supported the arguments and therefore the proposal of MP Bonny.
Eventually, due to the general confusion caused by the different proposals and arguments presented, the article was sent back to the Commission for debate and revision.[34] The revised version did eventually not include the word ‘in particular’ or the condition of a ‘contribution to a free formation of public opinion’.
 
In the detailed discussion of the draft in the Ständerat, Rapporteur Danioth began by summarizing the developments relating to the media clause. After the first reading by the Ständerat, the idea was that the data protection law only applied to the media until the publication. After publication, Art. 28 of the Civil Code was applicable. The right to access data was restricted in its applicability to the media. It would only apply after publication. The Commission of the Nationalrat, in contrast, had after thorough discussion decided to adopt a different model. Data protection should generally apply to the media, before and after publication. As regards the rights enshrined in the data protection law, they barely differed from the rights enshrined in Art. 28 of the Civil Code regarding the remedies an individual could take against inaccurate information in a publication. However, the Nationalrat recognized the concerns voiced by the Ständerat that a right to access data could restrict the freedom of the media. Therefore, the media should be privileged in three different areas: (a) the right to access could be restricted if it exposed the journalistic source; (b) the media could restrict access to pre-publication drafts; and (c) where the free formation of an opinion of the public is endangered. Similarly, the personal work instruments of journalists were privileged, but only as far as these relate to the periodical and editorial part of their work rather serving a commercial purpose. He recommended to accept these changes proposed by the Nationalrat. He did, however, note that two changes should be made. First, it should be made clear that the right to access could not only be restricted but indeed denied or just postponed. Second, the Commission discussed how these restrictions of the right to access relate to the authority and competences of the data protection officer. The data protection officer should be bound by the above listed restrictions, but could otherwise investigate media. This would, however, not need to be explicitly mentioned in the law.[35]
MP Schmid, in contrast, proposed to delete the whole article without replacement. It would not matter who keeps and processes personal data. Anyone who did, should be bound by the law.[36] This amendment was not adopted. Federal Councilor Koller once again weighed the different rights, freedoms and interests which would have to be carefully balanced. He noted that in light of the threats that a referendum would be brought against the law, he considered it to be necessary to in principle subject the media to it. The provision proposed would be a good middle ground between fully subjecting the media to the data protection law and completely exempting it. As the media would surely bring a referendum against the law if the proposal by MP Schmid was adopted, he recommended rejecting it.[37] MP Schmid’s proposal was subsequently rejected.[38] No further debates took place on the issue.
 
The Nationalrat finally adopted the law on 19 June 1992.[39] The Ständerat adoped the law on the same day.[40]
 
Broad Expression Derogation
No debates were recorded in this regard.
 
Personal Exemption
No debates were recorded in this regard.
 
Knowledge Facilitation Derogation
Pursuant to Federal Council’s report, there was a particular public interest in the processing of personal data for research, planning and statistical purposes.[41] Art. 19 of the proposed Data Protection law accordingly provided for special rules for the processing of data for these purposes. The Article was accordingly applicable to data processed for research, planning and statistical purposes not relating to particular persons [‘nicht personenbezogen’] by responsible organs or the disclosure of data for such purposes by other organs of the federal state or the cantons or private persons.[42]
 
The knowledge facilitation derogation was not substantively debated in either the National- or Ständerat.
 

II. Second-Generation Statutory Law

Switzerland Act during this period, as well as the associated Ordinance, are both available.  As a jurisdiction outside the EEA (albeit within the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)), Switzerland was not bound to mirror Directive 95/46.  Switzerland was the first jurisdiction to achieve data adequacy status under this instrument.
 
Special Expression Derogation
See above.
 
Broad Expression Derogation
See above.
 
Personal Exemption
See above.
Knowledge Facilitation Derogation
See above.
Parliamentary Debates
As the presently relevant articles remained unchanged, no debates took place with regard to either the special expression or knowledge facilitation derogation or the personal exemption.[43]
 

III. Third-Generation Statutory Law

Switzerland significantly amended the Data Protection Law on 25 September 2020. As a non-EEA EFTA jurisdiction, Switzerland is not bound by the GDPR although a number of the changes adopted were seen as responding to it.  Although no referendum has been brought against this amended version, the official version has not yet been published and the law will not enter into force until 1 January 2022.[44] Other than certain amendments related to knowledge facilitation, none of the relevant provisions have changed since 1992 (excepting alterations in numbering).
 
Special Expression Derogation
The special expression derogation now found in art. 27 has not changed compared to the 1992 Data Protection Law.
 
Broad Expression Derogation
Not outside knowledge facilitation but see the change as regards public memory institutions below.
 
Personal Exemption
The personal exemption has not changed compared to the 1992 Data Protection Law.
 
Knowledge Facilitation Framework
The violation of the personality of a data subject [‘Persönlichkeitsverletzung’] through the processing of personal data can be justified if the personal data is processed for non-personal purposes, in particular research, planning and statistics, if three conditions are met: (1) the data is anonymized as soon as the respective processing purposes allowed for it, unless such an anonymization is impossible or disproportionately difficult in which case other appropriate protective measures have to be put in place to avoid an identification of the affected individual; (2) in case the processed data are sensitive it may only be disclosed to third parties in a manner which does not allow for the identification of an affected individual or, if this is impossible, it must be ensured that the third party only processes such data for non-personal purposes; and (3) the results are published in a manner which does not allow for the identification of the affected individual (art. 31(2)(e)).
 
Organs of the federal government may process personal data for non-personal purposes, in particular for research, planning or statistics, if (a) the data is anonymized as soon as the processing purposes allows therefore; (b) sensitive data is only disclosed to third parties in a manner which does not allow for the identification of the affected individuals; (c) the recipient only discloses such data to third parties with the express permission of the respective organ of the federal government; and (d) the results are only published in a manner which does not allow for the identification of the affected persons. If these conditions are met, If these conditions were met, derogations from compatibility clause, the legitimating ground and notification conditions were permissible (art. 39).
 
The rectification, deletion or destruction of personal data cannot be requested with regard to the collections of publicly accessible libraries, educational institutions, museums, archives or other public memory institutions. If the applicant does, however, demonstrate an overriding interest, he or she may request that the respective institution restricts access to the disputed data (art. 41(5)).
Parliamentary (and wider Legislative) Debates
Special Expression Derogation
Art. 27 of the revised Data Protection Law corresponds to former Art. 10 on the derogation from the right to access personal data for journalists [‘Medienschaffende’]. Other than a change of numbering, no revision of the original Art. 10 took place. Accordingly, pursuant to the Federal Council, the condition for the derogation that the respective data are published in the editorial part of a periodically published medium remains in place. The provision was not further discussed in the legislative process.
With regard to the provision on information to be provided on the collection of personal data, the Federal Council observed that derogations therefrom were possible for journalistic purposes. As the Federal Council elaborated, there is considerable public interest in investigative journalism which may allow for a considerable limitation thereof.[45] However, the media is not explicitly mentioned in the respective provision.[46]
 
Broad Expression Derogation
With regard to Art. 41(5) on legal entitlements [‘Rechtsansprüche’], the Federal Council noted that the right to be forgotten is not absolute and has to be balanced against the rights to freedom of expression and information, which regularly outweigh the former.[47]
 
Knowledge Facilitation Framework
Pursuant to the Federal Council, the derogation for the processing of data for research, planning and statistical purposes was made slightly stricter [‘leicht verschärft’], introducing three cumulative conditions for derogation for such purposes. It was argued that this change should strengthen the protection of particularly sensitive data, particularly in light of the possibilities of ‘Big Data’ and the increasing digitalization of our daily lives which result in an increasing amount of particularly sensitive data being processed.[48]
Revised Art. 39 is accordingly largely congruent with Art. 22 of the 1992 Data Protection Act. However, a paragraph pursuant to which sensitive data may only be disclosed to private third parties in a form which does not allow to identify the respective data subject was added. According to the Federal Council, this should ensure a better protection of sensitive data.[49]
 
Moreover, following the proposal of the Federal Council, a new paragraph was added in the section on ‘Special Provisions on the Processing of Personal Data by Organs of the Federal Government’ providing that the correction, deletion or destruction of data could not be requested in relation to the collections or holdings of publicly accessible libraries, educational facilities, museums, archives or other public ‘memorial institutions’ [‘Gedächtnisinstitutionen’]. Pursuant to the Federal Council, this derogation would be justified in light of the considerable public interest based on the freedom of information to keep such documents unchanged and original, as momentous displays of the past.[50]
 

[1] Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz (DSG) (23. März 1988) BBl 1988 II 413 https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=10050713 (last accessed 17 December 2020), 462.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ständerat, Datenschutzgesetz, A.S. 1990 II 125, p. 128 https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20018586.pdf?ID=... (last accessed 20 April 2021).
[4] Ibid, p. 133.
[5] Nationalrat, Datenschutzgesetz, AS 1991 III 938 (5 June 1991) https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20019960.pdf?ID=... (last accessed 22 April 2021), 938-9.
[6] Ibid 939.
[7] Ibid 941.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid 942.
[10] Ibid 943.
[11] Ibid 943.
[12] Ibid 944.
[13] Ibid 944.
[14] Ibid. 946.
[15] Ibid 946.
[16] Ibid 946.
[17] Ibid 947-8.
[18] Ibid 949.
[19] Ibid 951.
[20] Nationalrat, Datenschutzgesetz AS 1991 III 957 (6 June 1991) 958 https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20019961.pdf?ID=... (last accessed 22 April 2021).
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid 959.
[23] Ibid 960.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid 961.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid 962.
[30] Ibid 963.
[31] Ibid 964.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid 965.
[35] Ständerat, Datenschutzgesetz AS 1991 V 1018 (5 December 1992) 1023 https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20020836.pdf?ID=... (last accessed 22 April 2021).
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid 1024.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Nationalrat, Schlussabstimmung, AS 1992 III 1267 (19 June 1992) 1267 https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20021346.pdf?ID=... (last accessed 22 April 2021).
[40] Ständerat, Schlussabstimmung, AS 1992 III 628 (19 June 1992) 628 https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20021463.pdf?ID=... (last accessed 22 April 2021).
[41] BBl 1988 II 413 (n 1) 473.
[42] Ibid, 473.
[43] For an overview of the amendments and the parliamentary debates in this regard, visit: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1993/1945_1945_1945/de/changes (last accessed 22 April 2021).
[44] Based on Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz (Datenschutzgesetz, DSG) vom 25. September 2020, available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2020/7639.pdf (last accessed 17 December 2020).
[45] BBl 2017 6941, 7055.
[46] See Art. 20 DSG (25 September 2020).
[47] Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Totalrevision des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz und die Änderung weiterer Erlasse zum Datenschutz (15 September 2017) BBl 2017 6941 https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2017/6941.pdf (last accessed 17 December 2020), 7077.
[48] BBl 2017 6941, 7075-6.
[49] BBl 2017 6941, 7083.
[50] BBl 2017 6941, 7086.